ERP is not dead. The commercial model around it is. No large enterprise has decommissioned a tier-one HRIS or finance system in favour of an AI-native alternative, the frontier AI labs run Workday themselves, and UK and EU regulation is hardening around exactly the architecture the incumbents provide. The real movement is commercial: consumption-based pricing is quietly repricing the back office.
Four decisions matter for 2026 and 2027.
Platform bets. Push back-office work onto the ERP vendor and its ecosystem partners by default. Reserve specialist tools for genuinely differentiated, usually customer-facing, capabilities.
Consumption. Flex credits, AELA and Joule reprice the back office as metered consumption that neither you nor the vendor can reliably forecast. Model the cost envelope before signature, not after.
Liability. Mobley v Workday shows AI vendors can be directly liable for discriminatory screening outcomes, and buyers are not insulated. Audit your screening vendors and your claim to meaningful human involvement now.
Deadlines. EU AI Act Article 10 obligations apply from 2 August 2026, the FRC and ICO guidance is already in force, and SAP ECC 6.0 mainstream maintenance ends in December 2027.
The work of 2026 and 2027 is to govern, instrument and augment the system you already have. The cheapest first step is an integration optimisation review, done before any consumption contract is signed.
In early 2026, Workday, SAP, Oracle, ServiceNow and Salesforce lost more than a trillion dollars of market value in three months. The phrase doing the rounds is the ‘SaaSpocalypse’.1 2
The argument is that agentic AI will make enterprise software obsolete, and that the CFO who renews a Workday contract in 2026 will look like the IT director who renewed a mainframe lease in 1995.3
It’s a good story. But it’s not what we are seeing in the boardroom.
As of July 2026, we can find no Fortune 500 or FTSE 100 company that has decommissioned a tier-one HRIS or finance system in favour of an AI-native alternative.
The frontier AI labs themselves are Workday customers.
The regulatory regime in the UK and EU is formalising around exactly the architecture the incumbents already provide.
None of that means the existing model continues unchanged.
What is changing, fast, is the commercial relationship with the vendor. Workday’s flex credits, Salesforce’s AELA, SAP’s Joule consumption and Oracle’s Agent Studio pricing are repricing back-office software in ways most CFOs have not modelled, and most procurement teams cannot meaningfully negotiate. The serious question for the next eighteen months is not whether to rip out your system of record. It is how to govern, instrument and augment it under tightening regulation, while not signing a consumption contract that funds your vendor’s AI roadmap with an open-ended cheque from your P&L.
This paper sets out what we are seeing in CFO and CHRO conversations across our client base, and what to do about it.
The narrative that ERP is dead is loudest from people with something to sell.
The first group is incumbent software CEOs trying to consolidate. Bill McDermott of ServiceNow framed agentic AI at Knowledge 2025 as the moment “the industrial software complex of the 20th century is being integrated, and in some cases, drastically reduced in numbers of applications.” 4
During the February 2026 sell-off, he told the Wall Street Journal, “We don’t live in a SaaS neighbourhood.” Marc Benioff went further on Salesforce's Q4 FY26 earnings call, arguing that companies that fail to cannibalise themselves will be cannibalised by competitors.
Having watched Salesforce shares fall around 40 per cent from peak, Benioff stopped trying to dismiss the “SaaSpocalypse” and claimed it.5
The second group is venture capital funding the next wave. Sarah Tavel laid the intellectual groundwork in 2024 with “AI startups: sell work, not software”,6 arguing that LLMs allow pricing against labour cost rather than per-seat. Sam Lessin announced he would short the structured CRM companies. Julien Bek of Sequoia, who wrote the Series A cheque to Rillet, was more candid:
“The general ledger is the beating heart of the finance function, and so asking a company to remove it is a kind of open-heart surgery.”Julien Bek, Sequoia Capital7
The third is one analyst house. Phil Fersht and HFS Research coined “Services-as-Software” in 2024 and project a 1.5 trillion-dollar market by 2035. The forecast methodology is not public. It is HFS’s own number, not Gartner’s or IDC’s. Seth Ravin of Rimini Street is the bluntest of all, declaring that “ERP software is dead.” Rimini sells third-party support, so it has a direct commercial reason to shrink the perceived value of the core platforms.8 9
Two things are worth noticing about that list.
First, the actual evidence each offers is thinner than the rhetoric. Klarna is the central proof point, and on inspection, it collapses (more on this below). Anthropic is the second, and it collapses harder. Beyond those two, the AI-native challengers most often cited as evidence (Rillet, Campfire, DualEntry, Sierra, Decagon) are doing something real but in a specific market segment. Their named customer lists are growth-stage technology companies under roughly 50 million dollars of revenue: Windsurf, PostHog, Coder, Replit, Trust & Will, Flex, Advisor360. That is a genuine mid-market displacement story against NetSuite and Sage Intacct. It is not an enterprise replacement story against Workday, SAP S/4HANA or Oracle Fusion.10 11 12 13 14
Second, the most credible voice on the rip-and-replace side is undermining his own pitch. Rujul Zaparde, CEO of Zip, the procurement vendor at a 2.2-billion-dollar valuation with named customers including T-Mobile, Mars, OpenAI, Anthropic, LinkedIn and Block, describes his own product as follows:
“Those systems [SAP, Oracle] are great systems, but they’re systems of record. Zip is the orchestration layer that sits on top of those systems.”Rujul Zaparde, CEO, Zip15
If the most-cited next-generation procurement vendor describes itself as a layer that sits on top, the rip-and-replace story is not what the rip-and-replace vendors are actually selling.
Three claims are doing a lot of work in the market. Each one collapses on inspection.
It did not. Klarna replaced Workday with Deel, another SaaS HRIS, and uses a blend of third-party SaaS and in-house tools where Salesforce used to be. 16
Sebastian Siemiatkowski has since walked the AI-replaces-customer-service story back publicly, conceding the company “focused too much on efficiency and cost. The result was lower quality.” 17
Klarna listed in July 2025 at a valuation of roughly 19.65 billion dollars; within two months of the listing, the flagship AI efficiency story was reversing, and the company was rehiring humans under a flexible model. 18 19
The case study most often cited as proof of rip-and-replace is, on closer inspection, a cautionary tale about doing it badly.
Workday CEO Aneel Bhusri named Anthropic, OpenAI and Google as Workday customers on the Q4 FY26 earnings call in February 2026. The exact phrasing: “Just for what it’s worth, Anthropic, Google and OpenAI all run Workday.” 20
Anthropic’s Head of Growth, Amol Avasare, confirmed it on Lenny Rachitsky’s podcast in April 2026. Anthropic then hired Workday’s CTO Peter Bailis in March 2026 to help build its internal HR systems, and has been hiring for roles requiring Workday, Salesforce and NetSuite experience. 21 22 23
Anthropic’s Chief Commercial Officer is ex-ServiceNow and ex-Salesforce. The frontier AI lab whose technology is supposedly killing the ERP runs the ERP, has hired the ERP vendor’s CTO to build the AI layer around it, and is staffing to sell into the enterprise software stack rather than burn it down.
It did not. Battery Ventures surveyed CFOs from December 2025 to February 2026, at the height of the panic; 77 per cent wanted AI layered on top of their existing systems from new vendors, and only 15 per cent wanted to replace their system of record with an AI-native platform. By April the more sophisticated investor commentary had landed on the right diagnosis: the vulnerability was concentrated in per-seat pricing for task-level work (task management, contract review, SDR outreach, expense coding), not in systems of record. 24
The regulatory, audit, integration and data moats around a finance or HR system of record are not reproducible with a vibe-coded weekend project. Goldman Sachs’ David Solomon called the sell-off “too broad.” Aaron Holiday of 645 Ventures was more direct: “This isn’t the death of SaaS.”1 2
Counter-voices have been consistent. Aaron Levie said:
“Generally, once you have a business process, you want to be able to define that in, effectively, business logic with deterministic systems, just because the risk of that changing any given day is very high.”Aaron Levie, CEO, Box, TechCrunch Disrupt in October 202525
Josh Bersin has been direct for two years:
“I don’t think there’s an existential threat of people throwing out their HCM, CRM or ERP for ChatGPT. The AI is not going to build the system for you.”Josh Bersin, The Josh Bersin Company26
McKinsey’s own briefing concludes flatly that AI agents are unlikely to replace the ERP in the near or medium term because of system complexity. Even Gartner, which authored the headline 450-billion-dollar agentic AI projection, published in June 2025, stated that more than 40 per cent of agentic AI projects will be cancelled by the end of 2027 on cost, value and risk grounds. Gartner analyst Anushree Verma coined the useful term “agent washing” for rebranded chatbots and RPA.27 28
The system of record becomes a control plane
The architectural direction of travel is visible across every major back-office vendor. Workday’s Agent System of Record (now powered by Sana, after Workday’s 1.1 billion dollar acquisition in September 2025), SAP’s Joule Studio with its 400-plus embedded AI use cases, Oracle’s AI Agent Studio with 600-plus embedded agents, ServiceNow’s AI Agent Fabric, Microsoft’s Copilot for Finance bundled into M365: none of these vendors is sleepwalking through the agentic transition.29 30 31 32 33
The pattern is the same across all of them. Agents themselves need a system of record, to be onboarded, permissioned, audited and retired. The HRIS and ERP pattern already provides that for employees. It is being extended to agents. Far from being abstracted away, the core is becoming a more central control plane (see Figure 1). Gartner’s Alastair Woolcock put it crisply:
“Vendors that embed AI within this control plane will shape workflow execution. Vendors that treat AI as an enhancement layer risk being abstracted.”Alastair Woolcock, Gartner34
The reason this is happening, rather than a clean replacement, is technical and legal. A deterministic system produces the same output from the same input every time. A three-way match passes or fails. Posted journals reconcile. Payroll calculations reproduce. A probabilistic system, however capable, can produce different outputs on identical inputs.
That is a feature when extracting unstructured data from a messy invoice. It is a liability when the output is a journal entry, a payroll calculation, a statutory report or a hiring decision. Three chained agentic steps at 90 per cent reliability each give roughly 73 per cent end-to-end accuracy. That compounding is what finance and HR audit frameworks are not built to absorb.
The regulatory reinforcement is direct. The FRC’s Generative and Agentic AI guidance (March 2026) is the first from any audit regulator globally and makes clear that firms and Responsible Individuals remain accountable regardless of AI use. UK GDPR Article 22A, as amended by the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025, restricts solely automated decisions with legal or similarly significant effects, including pay, benefits, discipline, promotion, and termination. 35
Article 10 of the EU AI Act categorises all HR recruitment, evaluation, promotion and termination AI as high-risk, with full obligations applying from 2 August 2026. Penalties reach 35 million euros or 7 per cent of global annual turnover. The ICO’s Recruitment Rewired guidance (March 2026) signals that “meaningful human involvement” claims will be tested closely. DORA, applied 17 January 2025, pulls critical third-party AI providers to EU financial entities into regulated scope.36 37 38 39 40
Whatever else is true, the regulator will not accept a defence based on the assertion that the agent made the decision.
The system of record is where accountability lives.
The published case-study base for AI-on-ERP is thin and dominated by US firms and vendor-marketed material. Where we have direct visibility through our own client engagements, the picture is messier than any vendor deck suggests. We have anonymised the clients in the mini case studies below.
Client 1 is a Workday customer that we are helping roll the platform across the enterprise. The business positions itself to investors as AI-native and is pushing AI deep into operations, finance and HR. Six months ago, Client 1 committed to Workday Recruiting, with a price hold from Workday. They have since decided to jettison it in favour of Ashby, an AI-native Applicant Tracking System, on the basis that Ashby feels more current. The IT function disagrees, because consolidating onto fewer platforms was the original strategy. The fight is unresolved.
The point is not that Ashby is the wrong choice or that Workday Recruiting is the right one. The point is that the basic stakeholder alignment problem (IT versus the business, consolidation versus the latest thing, build versus buy) has not gone away because AI is now the variable. It has got worse. Client 1’s CIO and CHRO do not have a settled plan, because the market keeps moving under them. Workday changes its pricing model. Anthropic ships a new capability. Google announces something at Cloud Next. The plan from one Monday is obsolete by the next.
Client 2 went through a Sana Learn demonstration in which one attendee, the head of learning, audibly cried partway through. Her team of eight was responsible for learning content development, with translation outsourced to external agencies on six-week cycles. Sana Learn could plausibly halve the headcount and remove the translation supplier entirely. Her boss’s response was the right one: rather than take out the cost, redeploy the team to transform learning content for the wider organisation, and partner with operations to retrain call centre staff. The detail of how that gets funded is unresolved. But the strategic instinct, to use the productivity gain to do more rather than less, is the right one.
It is also the conversation most CFOs and CHROs are not yet having clearly with their boards, despite the data running the same way. Forrester reports that 55 per cent of employers regret AI-driven layoffs and 57 per cent of AI investment decision-makers expect headcount to increase, not decrease. BCG’s AI Radar 2025 found 68 per cent of companies expect to maintain workforce size. Mercer’s Global Talent Trends 2026, based on around 12,000 respondents, found 43 per cent expect no major change, 32 per cent foresee reduction and 13 per cent expect increase. The “50 per cent finance headcount cut” framing being pushed in some boardrooms is not in the data.42 43 44
Client 3 illustrates the harder version of the same problem. The CHRO felt let down by Workday, which he had bought in 2017, expecting it to be the future, and was being approached by six or seven AI-native HR vendors offering to build solutions on top of Workday. Some were credible, some were not. The argument that ultimately landed was not that Workday’s AI was already best-in-class. It was that the smaller vendors were either going to be acquired by larger ones, lacked the capital to build out properly, or did not understand the HR function as deeply as Workday did. Trust the vendor that knows your function, not the vendor with the prettiest demo. Client 3 subsequently implemented Paradox, an AI recruiting solution that has since been acquired by Workday, thereby vindicating the exact consolidation logic that drove the decision.
Behind these three stories sits a structural issue every CFO and CHRO should recognise. CIOs and CTOs cannot finalise an agentic AI architecture, because the architecture they would commit to in any given month is invalidated by the next month’s vendor announcements. Workday reworked its AI commercial model repeatedly between September 2025 and mid-2026: flex credits unveiled at Workday Rising, Sana repositioned as the AI brand in March 2026 and, according to partner briefings, complimentary credits bundled with signature of the new subscription agreement by May.45 46 Its line on what partners may build has shifted over the same period.47 That is one vendor. Multiply by the number of platforms in any large enterprise stack and the planning problem becomes obvious.
This calibrates the scepticism with which any ‘rip-and-replace’ pitch deserves to be heard. The history of major ERP change is not flattering. Lidl wrote off 600 million euros on SAP eLWIS between 2011 and 2018. Birmingham City Council’s Oracle Cloud migration ran to between 80 and 100 million pounds against a 5.3-million-pound annual budget; a Grant Thornton audit in February 2025 found the council had operated “without an adequate financial management system and cash receipting system for over two years.” Maine’s Workday HR project failed at 35 million dollars. Bain’s 2025 benchmarking survey of 480 IT leaders found that more than 80 per cent of ERP transformations miss budget, timeline and value goals. The baseline failure rate of major ERP change is already high. Adding agentic AI to a bad change programme will not improve it. It will make it worse, more expensively, and faster.48 49 50 51
Of all the AI-adjacent risks, Mobley v Workday goes most directly to the question CHROs should be asking.
Who carries the liability when an AI screening tool produces discriminatory outcomes?
The short answer the court has given so far is potentially the vendor, not just the employer. That is novel.
Derek Mobley, a Black man over 40 with anxiety and depression, applied to more than 100 jobs at companies using Workday’s AI-driven applicant screening from 2017 onwards. He was rejected every time, often within minutes, sometimes in the middle of the night, without human review. 52
Four additional plaintiffs have joined his case, all over 40. In July 2024, Judge Rita Lin in the Northern District of California denied Workday’s motion to dismiss, accepting that Workday could be directly liable under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA as an “agent” of the employers using its tools. Her reasoning is the line CHROs need to read:52 53 54
“Workday’s software is not simply implementing in a rote way the criteria that employers set forth but is instead participating in the decision-making process by recommending some candidates to move forward and rejecting others.”Judge Rita F. Lin, Northern District of California52
A software vendor whose tool recommends or rejects candidates is, for civil rights purposes, an agent of the employer.
In May 2025, the court granted preliminary certification as a nationwide collective action under the ADEA. Workday’s own filings disclosed that 1.1 billion applications were rejected using its software tools during the relevant period. The collective could include hundreds of millions of members. 53
In July 2025 the scope expanded to include Workday’s HiredScore AI features, with Workday ordered to provide the court with a list of customer companies that had enabled HiredScore by 20 August 2025.54 55 56
Mobley alleges 100+ algorithmic rejections.
Workday could be liable as “agent” under Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA.
Vendor liability established as theory.
Nationwide. Anyone over 40 denied via Workday since Sep 2020 may join.
1.1 billionapplications rejected in the relevant period
AI features brought in; disparate impact claim allowed to proceed.
Workday ordered to identify customers with HiredScore.
If your name is on it, applicants will be notified.
No liability ruling yet. Procedural precedent already set.
As of early July 2026, the case is in discovery on the merits: Workday’s further motion to dismiss was denied on 6 March 2026, and the opt-in window for the ADEA collective closed the following day with around 14,000 claimants.57 No liability ruling has been issued. But the procedural precedent (see Figure 2) is itself the story. AI vendors can face direct liability under civil rights law, not just their customers. SaaS contractual disclaimers of the form “we only provide the tool, the employer decides” are being tested, and so far, not holding. The disparate-impact claim, which does not require proving intent, only outcome, has been allowed to proceed.
The candid view from clients is closer to a shrug than a serious risk assessment. The position we hear most often, summarised generously, is that algorithmic bias is the vendor’s problem to solve, not the buyer’s.
There is a commercial logic to the position. Better that Workday, with deeper pockets and deeper expertise, deals with explainability than an individual CHRO does. But it is also a hostage to fortune. An audit finding, for example, that no candidates with Irish names have been progressed for interview, is not going to be satisfied by “Workday made me do it.”
Two practical points for any CHRO whose name is on the customer list Workday was ordered to disclose.
The theory of liability applies to any AI screening vendor, not only Workday. Eightfold, HireVue, Paradox, Pymetrics, and any Applicant Tracking System with AI scoring are exposed to the same logic.
A separate case, Kistler v Eightfold, was filed in California in January 2026, naming PayPal in the litigation filings.58 Harper v Sirius XM, filed in Michigan in August 2025 over the iCIMS screening tool, is progressing on similar theories.59 The question is not whether your vendor is being sued.
The question is whether your contractual structure protects you when a similar action is filed against the next vendor on the list.
“Meaningful human involvement” is not a phrase your vendor’s compliance team can settle on your behalf. The ICO has signalled it will test the claim. A human rubber-stamping an algorithmic decision is not meaningful human involvement, by either the ICO’s reading or Judge Lin’s reasoning. If your screening process today consists of an automated rejection, optionally reviewed by a human who never overrides the algorithm, the safe default is that you cannot honestly claim the involvement is meaningful.
A few other recent AI failures put the risk in context.
Air Canada was held legally liable for a chatbot that invented a bereavement-fare policy in 2024; damages were modest, but the precedent was sharp.60 McDonald’s ended its IBM drive-thru AI pilot in July 2024 after two years and 100-plus locations.61 Amazon’s recruiting AI was scrapped in 2018 after it penalised the word “women”. 62 iTutorGroup settled an EEOC case in 2023 for 365,000 dollars after its software auto-rejected women over 55 and men over 60.63 The Deloitte Australia incident, a 290,000-dollar government report partially refunded in October 2025 after AI-generated errors, is the early-warning shot for professional services firms using AI in client deliverables.64
The single most important commercial development for any Workday, SAP, Salesforce or Oracle customer in the next eighteen months is the shift from per-seat to consumption-based pricing for AI-driven functionality.
Workday’s flex credits are the leading edge of this. Salesforce has shipped three Agentforce pricing models in under eighteen months: 2 dollars per conversation at launch, then Flex Credits at 10 cents per action, then per-user AELA licences at 125 dollars or more per user per month.65 66 Of the roughly 5,000 Agentforce deals Salesforce had announced by February 2025, reports suggested only around 3,000 were paid.67 SAP and Oracle are following the same direction.
“Customers still adopt a cautious approach to investing in GenAI because of the unpredictability of pricing models.”Jan Cook, Senior licensing analyst, Gartner68
The mechanics of Workday’s model, as set out at a recent partner briefing, deserve closer attention than most CFOs are giving them (see Figure 3).
Workday is moving all 11,000 customers onto a new commercial architecture with three components. Sana is the AI brand that replaces Illuminate. UMSA, the Universal Main Subscription Agreement, replaces the old MSA and crucially flips innovation from opt-in to opt-out, with a console exposing granular data contributions per AI feature. Flex credits is the consumption-based model funding all of this.69
Each customer's subscription includes a platform entitlement: a defined threshold across three transaction types: API requests, integration events and document storage. Exceeding the threshold on any one triggers a charge; underuse on one type cannot offset overuse on another. Those overage charges are settled in flex credits, a virtual currency allocated to customers as part of their subscription. When the allocation runs out, additional flex credits must be purchased. There is no hard spend cap. Workday will not stop service when customers blow through entitlements.
Pricing is essentially fixed. Customers can negotiate the volume of pre-purchased credits and earn modest discounts on bulk, but it seems they cannot meaningfully negotiate the rate card. Customers cannot move credits from one bucket to another, so under-consumption in one area cannot offset over-consumption in another.
First, the salesperson on the other side of the table cannot accurately predict how many credits you will consume, and neither can you. You can estimate your transactions in finance and HR. You can probably estimate the business process calls those transactions make. You cannot reliably predict how many credits an agent will consume in handling them, because that depends on agent behaviour, fallback paths, retries and orchestration patterns that are still being built. Workday’s own usage estimator is reportedly not used internally with confidence.
The pattern is already visible at scale outside the ERP market. Uber gave its engineers Claude Code and burned through its entire 2026 budget for AI coding tools within four months, prompting its chief operating officer to question publicly whether the spend was producing more useful features.70 A developer tool is not an ERP consumption model, but the dynamic is identical: metered AI usage at scale is structurally difficult to forecast, and the finance team is usually the last to know.
Second, the new entitlement model meters things that used to be included. Workday’s own disclosures show transaction volume growing far faster than revenue, from more than 800 billion transactions a year in September 2024 to around 1.4 trillion by early 2026, against annual revenue growth of around 13 per cent.71 72 The commercial subtext, almost-but-not-quite said by Workday on partner calls, is that flex credits exist to close that gap. Customers are, in effect, being asked to fund Workday’s AI investment through consumption charges on infrastructure that was previously bundled. This is not a criticism. It is a description. CFOs should price the commercial model accordingly.
Third, when a Sana Enterprise agent acts on data that lives outside Workday (Outlook, SAP, ServiceNow, Google Workspace) the API call goes to the other vendor. So far, those vendors have not introduced API metering for agentic traffic. They will. The day Microsoft, SAP, Oracle or Google start charging for agent-driven API calls is the day every customer’s three-year cost envelope shifts again. This is the iceberg under the water. SaaS vendors carry direct cost when other vendors’ agents hit their data centres, and that bill is going to land somewhere. Aaron Levie’s “100x more agents than people” point is the CFO’s real concern: per-seat unit economics break long before the platform itself does.
There is a clear practical first move here, and it is unglamorous. Most enterprise Workday installations have integrations pinging the platform every five minutes for data that has not changed. Under flex credits and the new UMSA console, that wasted traffic is now metered and visible. A focused integration optimisation review (looking at endpoint frequency, payload size, polling versus event-driven patterns, and the IPs and APIs hitting Workday) can take a meaningful percentage off the consumption bill before the agentic AI conversation has even started.
This is exactly the kind of unsexy operational work that the implementation-led parts of the consultancy market are not focused on, and where Workday-specialist partners can demonstrably move the dial.
The serious advisory conversation for the next eighteen months comes down to four decisions.
None of them is “should we replace our ERP?”.
Clients cannot adopt every agentic platform on offer. They cannot wait for the market to settle either, because by 2027 the ERP and HRIS vendors will have shipped the second or third generation of their agent stacks, and the cost of being late will be material. The realistic question is which two or three platforms you will commit to, and where you will hold the line on standalone tools.
The default answer for back-office work (finance close, procurement, HR service desk, talent screening) is to push as much as possible onto the ERP vendor and its ecosystem partners. The vendor that knows your function, has the data, holds the regulatory burden, and has the capital to keep investing is the better long-term bet than a standalone AI vendor that may be acquired, may run out of cash, or may have built a thin layer over a model that the foundation labs will commoditise.
The exception is in genuinely differentiated capabilities (usually customer-facing, vertical-specific, or process-specific) where a specialist vendor materially outperforms what the ERP vendor will plausibly ship within eighteen months. Even then, the commitment should be conditional, with a clear exit path back to the ERP vendor’s stack if the specialist gets acquired or falls behind.
The MIT NANDA “State of AI in Business 2025” report is unambiguous on this. 95 per cent of enterprise GenAI pilots have not delivered measurable P&L impact. Buy-from-vendor partnerships succeed around 67 per cent of the time; internal builds succeed at roughly a third of that rate.73
McKinsey’s State of AI from November 2025 (1,993 respondents) found that 88 per cent of organisations use AI in at least one function, but only 7 per cent have scaled it and only 39 per cent attribute any EBIT impact, with most of those reporting under 5 per cent. High performers are 2.8 times more likely to have redesigned workflows (55 per cent versus 20 per cent) and to run human-in-the-loop validation (65 per cent versus 23 per cent). The build-it-yourself instinct, particularly for back-office use cases, is almost always the wrong instinct.74
There is a single category where the rip-and-replace narrative is genuinely right: small, single-entity, fast-growing UK technology companies running Sage or QuickBooks where Rillet or Campfire is materially a better answer than NetSuite.
Numeric’s own honest comparison summarises it well. AI-native ERPs are best suited for small companies with a SaaS focus. Companies at a further stage of growth, with complex accounting needs like usage-based billing or multiple entities, should consider augmenting their legacy ERP instead of rip-and-replacing. That is the buyer’s view, not the VC’s, and it is the right one.11
This is the CFO problem the board is not yet asking about, and should be.
Three sub-decisions sit underneath it.
Mobley is the early warning, and the work list already sits in the recommendations box in the Mobley section above: audit your AI screening vendors, read your contracts for indemnities that contemplate agent theory, and test whether your ‘human in the loop’ claim survives an honest reading of the ICO’s guidance. Treat it as a procurement and legal exercise, not a compliance one; the courts and regulators will judge your hiring outcomes, not your contract.
The FRC guidance landed in March 2026. ICO Recruitment Rewired landed in March 2026. EU AI Act Article 10 high-risk obligations apply in full from 2 August 2026. SAP ECC 6.0 mainstream maintenance ends 31 December 2027. DORA has applied to financial services entities since 17 January 2025. Each of these has practical implications for systems, processes and contracts. For the EU AI Act, the lead time has effectively expired: Article 10 obligations apply from 2 August 2026, weeks away at the time of writing, so an organisation that has not started is no longer preparing, it is managing exposure. The other deadlines still have lead times measured in quarters, not weeks.35 36 37 38 40
For SAP customers in particular, the 2027 deadline is not a soft date. Greenfield, brownfield or selective data transition are real strategic choices with twelve-to-eighteen-month lead times before they even start delivering. Rimini-commissioned research, treated as vendor-interested, puts only 14 per cent of SAP customers on S/4HANA Cloud and 30 per cent on RISE, with cost and value concerns as the main blockers. The decision-not-to-decide is itself a decision.
Statuses and countdowns are calculated against today’s date each time this page is opened.
The four decisions are one judgement on four fronts: where to commit, what it costs, who carries the liability, and when the clock runs out. Beneath all four sits one instinct to resist: building it yourself for back-office use cases. MIT NANDA's data is unambiguous. Buy from a vendor or partner, and build only where genuine differentiation justifies the failure rate.
The operational picture
Where AI is genuinely working in production, it sits in three places: as a conversational or drafting layer over the core, as an exception-handling and reconciliation layer around the core, or as an orchestration layer above the core calling ERP APIs. The ERP or HRIS remains the book of record. The pattern is consistent across the disclosed evidence base.
In finance close and reconciliation, BlackLine’s Verity suite drafts variance narratives, reconciliation matches and AR outreach; the human approves; the posting lands in SAP, Oracle or Workday. CEO Owen Ryan’s framing is the right one for CFOs:
“CFOs need to leverage AI but remain personally liable for financial accuracy, so a “black box” solution is not an option.”Owen Ryan, CEO, BlackLine75
AppZen claims Toyota recovered 700,000 dollars in duplicate expenses and policy violations through AI-assisted review layered over Concur, Workday Expenses, Oracle and SAP, with a customer list including Amazon, Airbus and Novartis.76
In procurement and AP, Coupa named operational customer results in its Q4 FY26 disclosures, including a 60 per cent reduction in RFP preparation and up to 15 per cent savings for Xylem across 200 million dollars of sourcing. Zip processes 355 billion dollars of spend a year and lists T-Mobile, Mars, OpenAI, Anthropic, LinkedIn and Block among customers, all sitting on top of existing SAP Ariba, Oracle and Coupa estates.77
In HR service desk and talent, Moveworks (now part of ServiceNow) has the most densely documented augmentation footprint, from Palo Alto Networks (351,000 hours saved) to Siemens (an AI assistant for 250,000 employees across 190 countries). New Relic handles PTO requests end-to-end in chat, with the transaction posting to Workday. The UI is abstracted; the system of record is not.78
In financial services, HSBC with Google Cloud’s Dynamic Risk Assessment cut AML false positives by 60 per cent across around 900 million monthly transactions, adjacent to, not inside, the ERP.79 Lloyds Banking Group has scaled Microsoft 365 Copilot to around 30,000 colleagues, reporting 93 per cent active use and around 46 minutes saved per person per day.80 Barclays is rolling out Copilot to 100,000 colleagues, with HR, travel and policy queries handled by a ‘Colleague AI Agent’ while core HR data stays where it is.81 Unilever runs SAP as its system of record and layers AI around it, and by mid-2024 had put 150 projects through its formal AI assurance process, against an estate of more than 500 AI systems.82
The pattern, repeatedly, is the same. The ERP and HRIS are the substrate. The AI is the layer.
HPE’s experience at Workday Rising 2024 makes the underlying point most clearly. Workday Skills Cloud, deployed three years earlier, was the substrate that made HPE’s later generative-AI HR ambitions possible. The unglamorous data work came first. There is a generation of CHROs and CFOs who will spend 2026 and 2027 learning that the AI investment they want to make in 2027 depends on the data and process work they should have started in 2025.83
Where Workday is the platform, our view is that the fastest credible route to value is solutions developed by Workday itself or its ecosystem partners, layered on top of the core. Sana Enterprise is being positioned as the orchestration layer across third-party apps (Outlook, Google Workspace, SAP, ServiceNow) as well as the AI brand inside Workday.
Whether Sana wins that orchestration role against Microsoft Copilot, Google Gemini and ServiceNow’s AI Agent Fabric is genuinely unresolved. Predicting the winner is not what Workday customers should be spending their time on. Preparing the core for whichever orchestrator wins is.
That preparation has three concrete components.
This is the work our Workday-specialist partner Preos is engaged in across the customer base. It is unglamorous, operationally specific, and it is where the difference between a 30 per cent flex-credits overage and a clean run is actually made.
Three frameworks come up repeatedly in serious advisory conversations and are worth naming briefly.
MIT CISR’s Enterprise AI Maturity Model identifies four capabilities: Strategy, Systems, Synchronisation, Stewardship. It places financially-outperforming firms in stages 3 and 4. DBS Bank is their reference case: 350-plus AI use cases, AI economic impact from 150 million Singapore dollars in 2022 to 370 million in 2024, projected over a billion in 2025.84
McKinsey’s “Rewired” six-capability model covers strategy, talent, operating model, technology, data, and adoption and scaling.85
However, the most useful framing for the conversation a CFO and CHRO need to have is BCG’s 10-20-70 rule: 10 per cent algorithms, 20 per cent data and technology, 70 per cent people and processes (see Figure 4). BCG’s Build for the Future 2025 study of 1,250 enterprises found only 5 per cent are “future-built” and achieve transformative AI value at scale. The failure mode is well-documented: organisations over-invest in the 10 per cent (the model, the algorithm, the agent) and under-invest in the 70 per cent that determines whether the algorithm changes anything operationally.41
BCG Build for the Future 2025 (1,250 enterprises): only 5% are “future-built” and achieve transformative AI value at scale.
McKinsey State of AI (Nov 2025, 1,993 respondents): 88% use AI in at least one function. Only 7% have scaled it.
High performers are 2.8x more likely to have redesigned workflows (55% vs 20%) and to run human-in-the-loop validation (65% vs 23%).
None of the three frameworks contemplates replacing the system of record. All frame AI as a re-layering of the operating model on top of it. The 70 per cent is where the embarrassments and the wins of 2026 and 2027 will both come from. It is also the part the implementation-focused parts of the consultancy market are systematically not focused on. That 70 per cent is where Change Associates works. Our business is the process, people and change work that the 10-20-70 research says determines whether the investment pays back: stakeholder alignment, operating model design, adoption, and the governance that makes a deployment defensible. The algorithms will keep improving without our help; the organisation will not.
Source Global Research’s Q2 2025 survey found 81 per cent of clients had paid for AI-related consulting support in the previous twelve months. The global technology consulting market is forecast to pass 400 billion dollars in 2026.
“Investing to upgrade their legacy infrastructure is at the top of [clients’] to-do lists. It is not something they are willing to hold off on until the market becomes clearer.”Nick Jotischky, Source Global Research86
The market is moving. The question is whether the buyer ends up on the right side of the 10-20-70 split.
The temptation to predict which agentic platform wins is strong, and worth resisting. The market will sort some of that out. Acquisitions will sort the rest. What will not sort itself out is whether your organisation has the operational discipline to make a small number of platform bets, model the consumption envelope honestly, govern the vendor liability that comes with AI in HR, and hit the regulatory deadlines.
The framing to close on is straightforward. What’s the task? What’s the problem? What’s the fit-for-purpose solution? Push as much as you can onto the ERP vendor that already knows your function. Don’t get blinded by the AI light. Don’t build it yourself.
The ERP is not dead. The commercial model around it is, and the work for CFOs, CHROs and CIOs in 2026 and 2027 is to govern, instrument and augment what they already have under tighter regulation, with better consumption modelling, and with a clearer view than they currently have of where their vendor liability sits.
The CFOs and CHROs who will be embarrassed in two years are not the ones still running Workday, SAP or Oracle. They are the ones who bought the agent without redesigning the process, signed the consumption contract without modelling the cost envelope, claimed meaningful human involvement in an automated decision the regulator will test, or find their company’s name on a notification list to several hundred thousand applicants who believe they were discriminated against.
That is the conversation the boardroom should be having now.
A practical place to start is the integration optimisation review described above: a bounded first engagement that trims the consumption bill before any agentic contract is signed and gives the board an honest view of where the estate stands. If that would be useful, we would be glad to talk.